In the view of offensive realist, John Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, “the sad fact is that international politics have always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way.” With the international system being anarchical, offensive realist, John Mearsheimer states in his book that, “states operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interests, and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community.” The realists approach to international relations along with the international stage is called the standard security model. The standard security model rationalizes Iranian target to advance its nuclear program since, other states in the Middle East possess nuclear weapons. Using United States (US) intelligence community, it estimates that Pakistan has produced “90-110 warheads” ; none have been deployed, but instead kept in storage. Similarly, the US intelligence community estimates Indian has around the same number of nuclear warheads, also none have been deployed, but also kept in central storage. Finally, with India and Pakistan both possessing nuclear weapon capability and with the potential of Israel as well, providing the Iranian government with more valid arguments to pursue nuclear weapons in response to increasing their national interest, which in this case is their security.International norms on nuclear weapons have played a noteworthy role in the United States (US) and international community by attempting to get Iranian leaders to negotiate the release of their nuclear program. The first real establishment of international norms was under the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was an agreement signed in 1968, by several of the major nuclear and non-nuclear powers The treaty was a major success for advocates of arms control since it set a precedent for international cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear states to prevent proliferation:As the US, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom tested new nuclear technologies in the earth’s atmosphere; concerns emerged worldwide about the potential effects of radioactive fallout on the people exposed to it. These nuclear tests received worldwide scrutiny, not only for what they meant for the arms race, but also for what they meant for human life. With Iran (IR) ratifying the NPT in 1970 and with Article three of the treaty requiring non-nuclear states- parties to accept comprehensive international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, IR has accepted to become part of the international norms. According to John Mearsheimer, book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, “general theories of international politics offer useful tools for anticipating what lies ahead.” The Game theory will attempt to anticipate the moves IR will make in regards to its nuclear program. According to Adam Brandenburger’s article, Game Trees, “game tree is a formal description of how a non-cooperative game can be played.” It specifies the moves available to each player at each point in the game, the players’ knowledge when they move and the players’ evaluations of the different possible outcomes of the game. In game theory, decision makers are called players in this case, the US, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and IR. The Iranian nuclear program negotiation talks along with the UNSC and US decisions is the dilemma that the game theory will analyzes. This game theory situation will examine the numerous potential routes and their effect on it will have on the various players’ decisions. IR along with the, the 5 permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany met in Geneva, Switzerland, during a two-day talks remarking, on October 16, 2013. According to several leaders at the talks stated, that they had engaged in “substantive” and “forward-looking” discussions on the disputed Iranian nuclear program and that they would meet again in early November. IR possesses two routes pertaining national interests. To start, IR can compromise with the deal presented to them by the UNSC and the US, which would lead to an end to IR’s nuclear program. Secondly, IR can opt not to compromise and push to keep its nuclear program, but that runs the risk of obtaining unfavorable consequences. Likewise, the UNSC has options to consider in response to IR not compromising, either intensifying international penalties or trying to improve relations. Thirdly, the US has options to follow the UNSC’s attempts to increase injunctions, improve relations, or follow its own path of authorizing a military strike to take out the nuclear facilities. Indications have been publicized that both sides are nearing for a deal in the following months of the 2013-year. According to CBS news, “a new round was scheduled November 7th -8th, while the two talks were formally separate, they are linked by concerns over Iran’s nuclear aspirations, and progress in one may result in advances in the other.” A recent article published by Watson Institute for international studies, at Brown University, titled “The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Program: Policy Options, stated that the U.S must negotiate a deal with IR, “we must use diplomacy and economic incentives to convince Iran’s leaders to abandon any ambitions they have to acquire nuclear weapons.” This being said, if IR elects to compromise then the result will be that the UNSC and the US will most likely release several major sanctions placed on IR’s economy over the course of time. New news has developed over IR’s nuclear program and them striving near compromise, “envoys of Iran and six world powers will meet next week to start working out steps to implement a deal under which Tehran, IR’s capital, is to curb its nuclear program in return for some respite from sanctions, a top Iranian negotiator said.” 98% of the draft had been agreed but that Tehran wanted a “right to enrichment clearly stated in any deal according to Mr. Araqchi, Deputy Foreign Minister.” With IR bargaining, the country would ensue the second preferred choice and the first outcome, in regards to IR’s national interest, since it would allow IR to potentially recuperate its economic status. However, it would not be the best possible choice for IR since it is persisting to the UNSC to view its nuclear program as peaceful. Given that IR wants to continue its nuclear program, the most rational choice for IR is to not compromise with the nuclear negotiations. Since IR national interest is to keep its nuclear program.Since IR has decided not to compromise, in view of the fact that it was IR’s most rational choice, the country has adopted to follow the route where it could see its nuclear program destroyed and/or its sanctions escalated, or even military action from the US. Subsequently, this choice could also lead IR to the best option in respect to its national interest of keeping its nuclear program, and/or improving its relations with the international community. With IR, the UNSC and the US having no clear history of reaching agreements in the nuclear negotiations, IR could see the UNSC and the US undertake a new tactic. The UNSC and the US tactic of mending relations instead of imposing more sanctions, in an attempt to discourage the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Also, since the UNSC has never declared Iran to be in violation of the NPT, this provides IR more developed motives to follow the path of no cooperation. Most recently, a potential agreement between the UNSC and Iran failed to happen, “what ultimately spoiled an agreement remains unclear, but many Iranians took to social media to blame French Foreign Minister Laurent.” IR’s rational choice to not compromise has wounded the state in this setting, since the UNSC response to IR is to supplement additional international sanctions. This decision would not benefit Iranian interests when negotiating its nuclear program. In the situation, the end result would be the third best option in Iranian interests and the fourth outcome for IR to keep its nuclear program, since it would see its country endure more sanctions. Advocators of the sanctions would argue that their success is precisely what has made Mr. Rouhani, President of IR, “appear more accommodating, so the sanctions should not be eased before a final agreement is reached.” The pressure of numerous sanctions has made Mr. Rouhani, take immediate steps to fix the economy and therefore explains his wish to reach a deal before IR runs out of money. Next, international sanctions have shown to have an effect on IR’s nuclear program. According to Kenneth Katzman’s article, Iran Sanctions, “sanctions might also be slowing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs by hampering its ability to obtain necessary foreign technology.” If the UNSC arrives at this decision, the US would most likely support the decision. The pressure for more international sanctions from the US have resulted from US assessments indicating that sanctions have not stopped IR from developing new conventional weaponry, indigenously. Domestically the executive branch of the US is pushing for more sanctions, “on August 2, 2013, 76 Senators signed, a letter to President Obama urging a reinforcement of sanctions.” As the most recent talks take place domestic attention again push for more pressure, “some US politicians say they will push for more sanctions if the current talks taking place in Geneva fail.” IR’s rational choice to not compromise has been rewarded in this situation since the UNSC and the US response to improve relations comes in the form of potentially accepting IR’s nuclear program as civil, and liberating sanctions as IR meets specific “checkpoints,” set by the IAEA. This specific situation would be the best option and the second outcome for IR since Iran’s decision not to compromise has resulted in improved relations, but more importantly, IR gets to keep its nuclear program along with more international aid. According to the New Yorks Times, article by Peter Baker, ” it would also help facilitate a better relationship between Iran and the international community, as well as others in the region,” President Obama said referring to Tehran’s nuclear program. What’s more, improved relations with IR would also help improve the fact that there is an absence of mutual trust; this could be the main factor that has forced both sides to reach the current point of crisis. As the most recent talks have taken place in Geneva, again, “Tehran denies repeated claims by Western governments that it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, and insists it must be allowed to enrich uranium for power stations.” To prove that IR’s nuclear program is peaceful, the country has continually stated that its program only purposes are for power generation and medical isotopes. Besides, the Iranians have promised more transparency in its nuclear program and repeatedly asserted the peaceful nature of the program. Once again, IR has tried to prove that its program is entirety civil given that, “the deal in which Iran will curb its nuclear program is designed to halt any further advances in Iran’s nuclear campaign and to buy time for negotiations on a final settlement aimed at ensuring Tehran’s nuclear activity is wholly peaceful in nature.” Rational choosing from IR not to compromise has wounded the country once again, but in this instance, the UNSC is not involved, only the US military. This approach to IR would be the worst option possible since it is the third possible outcome for IR. Since IR would not see the release of international sanctions, or improved relations, but more importantly, witness its nuclear facilities destroyed. If the US does not have the same opinion with increasing sanctions or improving relations as the UNSC then the US will presumably employ its military supremacy to neutralize all the nuclear facilities. The US could see its window of opportunity closing in regards to controlling the expansion of IR’s nuclear program. The US having reason to deem an attack is probable, given that IAEA and Nonproliferation experts, from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have indicated apprehension towards unanswered questions over some aspects of IR’s nuclear program. Unanswered questions by both organizations such as IR’s refusal to allow inspectors to visit Parchin, a highly restricted military site just south of Tehran and accumulated enriched uranium, along with IR’s construction of a thermal heavy-water research reactor in Arak, near Tehran, since it could be a source of plutonium. These reports from the NNSA and IAEA all have shown that IR has more to prove about its nuclear program than what it is claiming. Game theory and the standard model have various similarities throughout. The major similarity between the two approaches, used by political scientists, is that both assume states as rational actors and their decisions reflect their interests. Game theory determines how other states follow their interests in response to other states their interests. States’ response to game theory will usually similar to the standard model because if one state decides for more power then the other state will pursue its best interests concerning the other states decision to increase power. Game theory and the standard security model that realists’ use are different in several ways. According to Garth Saloner’s article, Modeling, Game Theory, and Strategic Management, “game-theoretic modeling is the appropriate tool when studying strategic interactions between agents with differing goals.” The game theory allows players to follow different plans according to their best interests, which could be several things. While in the standard model its all about power and security. Game theory allows us to forecast moves that each player will fabricate according to the players’ interests and how the decision made will affect future decisions. Game theory offers us the best chance of resolution since it will us to interpret previous history and use that information to guess future moves that each player has. Seeing what each player will do in regards to their national interests will allow us to see that a deal could be made. In this game theory, IR has a 100% chance of compromising resulting in the first outcome of the game along with the end of the game. Therefore, it has a 33.3% chance of getting the outcome it really wants of keeping its nuclear program and international aid, and a 66.7% chance of getting an outcome that will not be favorable in increased sanctions, or military action. In the end, I believe that a compromise will be made since more factors are working against IR then are for at this stage of the negotiation process.Up to this point, the standard security model presents political scientists with the most evidence on the history of IR’s nuclear program. The reason that IR has pursued a nuclear program according to the standard model is the state is trying to pursue more security. Given that, IR’s Middle East neighbors India and Pakistan individually possess nuclear weapons with the possibility that Israel does as well. Furthermore, with IR’s nuclear program running, it will allow the country to feel protected, something states pursue according to the standard model. Since the Iranian government could have nuclear weapons from its nuclear program, it could threaten states if a state is eager to attack in the near future. If the international community takes away IR’s nuclear program, IR will most likely feel less secure since it will have no way of defending itself against its enemies other than the help of its allies. With IR’s neighbors in the Middle East in mind, IR has its national security to protect by pursuing nuclear weapons. In order for IR to proceed with its interests, certain rational choices have to be made regarding the nuclear program. IR possesses two routes compromising or opting not to compromise. The UNSC has the options of increasing sanctions or improving relations. The US can follow the UNSC in improving relations or increasing sanctions or follow its own path and authorizing a military strike on IR’s nuclear facilities. Game theory allows the international relations community to predict what moves each state or organization will make the effect it will have on another state or organization. All percentages show that compromising is the most effect outcome for IR. In the end, all evidence points that IR will reach a compromise.