In attempting to answer this question, a number of issuesand related questions spring to mind.
Firstly the definition of peaceoperations – does this include peace keeping, peace building and peaceenforcement?In attempting to outline reasonably objectives measures usedto judge the success (or failure) of a peace operation, one must first ask whatare the expectations of a successful peace operation? Should these expectationsbe evaluated within, or ignoring the context of variables that are often quiteof control of a peace operation – the complexity he mission, the point ofintervention and so on. While criteria or measurements to judge more finely therelative success of peace operations may be difficult to determine,particularly across different missions, many would argue that the presence of aneutral peace operation force on the ground within a conflict, at a veryminimum will bring a measure of security to the local civilian population andis bound to have some impact on reducing civilian injury and death. It seemsintuitively to be the case – but canthis assumption be made in relation to a minimum positive impact of peaceoperations. For instance, if much of an environment is out of control of themission, how can this really be assessed. Also if there is a minimum of shortterm benefit how this stand up over the long term? Also, can it be argued thatat times, possible negative impact of even supposedly neutral forces added intoa volatile situation on the ground at times outweigh whatever minimum benefit apeace operations bring to a situation.
It is clear that in attempting to answerthese questions, assumptions regarding even a minimum of benefit a peaceoperation may bring cannot be made, and that rigorous criteria need to beapplied to evaluate even the most minimum level of impact – positive ornegative.While there was much evaluation regarding the implementationof peace operations, for quite a long period not a lot of attention was givento development of a methodology for measuring their success. As ? Diehl, one ofthe earliest to attempt to do so, has pointed along with Druckman “Anabundance of attention has been given to the inputs (or independent variables)in peace operation studies,and considerably less (if any at all) is given to the outcomes (or dependent variables);” (2010) Diehl’s first attempt to provide a set of measurements forevaluating the success of peace operations involved defining two main criteria- whether they succeed in limiting an armed conflict and whether theycontribute to the resolution of the conflict. (1993). Having applied thesecriteria to a range of conflicts including … Diehl concluded that missionswere successful when they met the following conditions: the conflict wasintra-state, the peace-keeping were neutral, there at the invitation of thehost country, were lightly armed for self- defence only, neutral and thegeography of the conflict enabled the mission to operate with reasonable lackof invulnerability and which facilitated separation of combatants and detectionof violations of agreed peace??.
The conditions, particuraly the last ones referenced, whichhave to pertain to enable success with the criteria used, arguably invalidatethe criteria and indeed point to a degree of wasted effort in using them toanalyze missions except to validate the obvious – that the optimum conditionsprovide the optimum chance of success. In his analysis of Diehl’s initial criteria, Johansen criticizesthe fact that Diehl uses an ideal state of peace against which to judge thesuccess of a mission. (1994) The criteria don’t take into account theparticular context of a mission or the relative success that a mission have incontrast to what might have occurred if no peace operation had been introduced.Johansen also considers the second criteria to be one which peace keepers haveno influence or control and therefore should not be used at all. Johansen also criticizes the fact the Diehl doesn’tdistinguish between violent events thatpeace mission has no control over and ones that they do. He points thereforethat these issues can lead to very different judgements for peace missions thatcould otherwise be considered relatively successful. For example, UNEF1 operation which was pulledat the request of the Egyptians just prior the ’67 war, would be judged afailure because of ensuing war with Israel despite a previous decade or more ofpeace, while UNEF2 would be judged a success because of the Camp Davidagreement between Egypt and Israel although Johansen would argue thatpeacekeepers would have little or no influence or control over these events. (ME need to check does Diehl actually judge UNEF1 etc)Johansen argues instead that the effectiveness of peaceoperations should be judged by analysing their impact on local population , andby contrasting the situation with what would have occurred if the peaceoperation had not happened.
“Weshould try to judge whether peacekeeping operations reduce the likelihood ofviolence even by a modestdegree, discourage incidents from escalating, make violence less bloody when it does occur, or postpone”the inevitable” recurrence of conflict long enough to give diplomacy a further opportunityto succeed.” ME – either delete pointbelow or clarify and bring into reastJohansen also states thatinstead of using an ideal or “unexamined standard, peace operations should be “compared totraditional security policies” which will enable to extract a international code of conduct byan increasingly “authoratitive PO agency” ME – what does “traditionalsecurity policies” mean?? ie seems comparing “life with them againstlife without them”also in contrast to Diehlassertion that PO can never be enforcing, J points to Somalia and Yugoslavia as evidence of blend of trad. po and newtypes of UN enforcement as new means of POJohansen’s proposal to evaluate peace missions bycontrasting the situation with what might have been without their presence issomewhat problematic. If this was done using a “before and after”approach, efforts to evaluate the impact based on what was happening before theforces arrived and what after would require a very situation in which much ofthe conflict topography was similar, which may be unlikely given the volatilenature of conflict situations. Referring to some hypothetical scenario is open to the samecriticism launched by Johansen ofDiehl’s “ideal state of peace” yardstick.While initially peace operations were considered to be restrictedto peacekeeping rather than peace building, they certainly have evolved andJohansen’s criticism that Diehl’s second criteria is not relevant doesn’t standup at this point anyway.
Johansen also seems to be invaliding this criticismwhen he points to the evolvement of peace operations as far as not only peacebuilding but peace enforcement as in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Arguablyand even more because of the way peace operations have evolved, it can beconsidered reasonable to evaluate the impact a peace mission has on reducing oreliminating conflict within a region. Common sense has to dictate – forinstance in the Congo, the UN was considered to be completely ineffectiveoutside of the capital city. They didn’t have the manpower or resources tocover any substantial area.
But how then should such as mission be evaluated? Should the mission beconsidered a success because UN troops could reduce violence in an urban areawhere they had a reasonable presence? If so it would seem that Johansen wouldfall into the same (truism??) OR should the UN mission be considered in lightof the entire conflict. It seems that both answers are correct in order toprovide a fuller analysis of a mission. Restricting one’s gaze to the area ofdimension of the conflict solely under the control of the UN does provide someanalysis on how successfully peace forces are operating within those limits. However, to get a proper analysis of the impact theyare having, there also is a need to widen the view to the entire conflict andindeed to analyse the conflict vertically at different dimensions also (meclarify this)ME check UN in congoIn addition to Diehl, others such as Bratt and Browneattempted in the mid to late 90’s to provide a methodology and criteria foranalysis of peace missions. Bratt (1996) outlined these four criteria formission success: completion of the mandate, conflict resolution facilitation,conflict containment and reduction of casualties across the board. Brattconsidered a mission successful if it facilitate conflict resolution, andmoderately successful if any of the other three criteria were fulfilled.
Likewise Browne ( 1993?) referenced the fulfilmentof the mandate as a criteria for the success of UN mission as well asresolution of the conflict, and contributionto international peace by elimination or reduction of the conflict. (ME checkno plagiarism here – check Browne and rewordhttps://archive.org/stream/97-454-crs/97-454_djvu.
txt(me above article suggests many analysts state this thesecriteria and text goes on to analyse the criteria might be more accurate tostate that in report these criteria are referenced (or to leave her out??_ Later analyses include that of Darya Pushkina (2006) whoemphases the priority of reduction of human suffering as a measure of thesuccess of a peace operation. In her article “A recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping MIssion”,her primary focus is to analyse why some UN peace missions are more successfulthan others, but this necessitated defining a set of criteria with which tojudge the success of a mission. These criteria include the primary ones ofreducing conflict and human suffering in the area, preventing the conflict formspreading and contribution to its resolution. On that basis, Pushkina definedmissions such as UNTAG as successful, mission including UNTAC as partiallysuccessful and missions including UNPROFOR as unsuccessful.ME – put footnote hereMe – include the mission groups and why there weresuccessful?? maybe at least the successful – do we need to say why – includefootnote of acronyms Pushkina makes some important observations on previousanalyses of measurements for successful peace missions.
She raises an importantpoint in relation to those such as Bratt and Brown who would prioritize usingthe mandate of a mission. She argues that a mandate may be very specific to amission, but that missions may shareprimary goals which allow for evaluation and comparison of multiple missionsusing similar criteria. While one could argue that fulfilment of a mandateregardless of what that mandate might be, is a criterion which can be appliedto multiple missions, it would be seem to be helpful to have a similarspecified goal to evaluate across missions. For example, specific mandates mightbe as disparate as supervising elections or monitoring a ceasefire and it’seasier to evaluate multiple missions in how they succeed in relation to aparticular common goal.While an evaluation may be created to include goals common to mission as well asmandates specific to a mission, the methodology also needs to take into accountthe relative context that mission istaking place in. For example, violencecontainment are similar goals for the missions in .
.. and but surely thedifficulties inherent in achieving that goal are much higher in the first case.
Violence containment in one context may be much more difficult to attain thanin another. Therefore it seems essential to have some kind of baselineevaluation of the mission topography to which the criteria are being applied.There is also the issue with who’s applying the evaluation.
Stakeholders and vested interests may use evaluations to provide results thatare in their results.Another issue is the sad but realistic possibility that apeace operation may not impact positively or that the positive impact isoutweighed by negative impacts. Aframework that aims to provide an accurate evaluation must take account of negative variables such as hostility betweenpeace operatives and locals or violence inflicted by peace operatives on locals(Guardian, 2015) or potential paralysisin the long term of resolution ofdifficulties in countries with a longterm presence of operatives who’s primary focus is peacekeeping rather thanconflict resolution.
In later works, Diehl this time with Druckman (2010) returnsto the issue of a methodology of evaluating peace operations proposing a morenuanced and multi-dimensional approach at different point along a mission’stimeline. Diehl and Druckman argue that specifying primary goals for missionsenables criteria to be applied and evaluated across missions. They identify thefollowing goals that are common to many mission – “violence abatement,conflict containment and conflict settlement” ( ). In addition to generalgoals, they include mission-specific criteria for evaluating a mission. Variablesare not stand alone static references but are positioned in a relational aspectto one another to reflect a process. They use the following flowchart toindicate how the general goals interact with mission-specific ones (2010).
/ AnnieLeibovitz’s photographic work Robert La Fosse, New York City1990 (Leibovitz 1992, fig. 6) capturesthe essence of the dancer’s pain…..
….Note: Includethe author/artist and title of the work in the body of the text and put anin-text reference for the book that the image/illustration is in. In addition to a relational approach to variables, Diehl andDruckman acknowledge that variables may differ or may be evaluated differently depending on the ..at different levels.
So employ a multidimensional approach that takes distinctive account of componentseach of the following: the different stakeholders involved (local andinternational), varying timelines, specific baselines, the core and specific goalsof the mission.When criteria to judge the success of a peace operation, acomplicating factor is the nature of success – as Diehl and Druckman point out”success for whom?” They point to the fact there can be multiplestakeholders, interests and agenda for a peace operation. For example, thesupposed driver foe the peace operation in Cambodia was the establishment ofdemocracy but there was also a vested interest in re-integrating the country inthe region (whose interest – me)me – get reference and what do Druckman and Diehl say aboutdealing with this??Diehl and Druckman’s multidimensional methodology seems toaddress many of the weaknesses of Diehl’s earlier criteria.
It allows for thesuccess of general goals to be evaluated while also grounding the criteria inthe specifics of a mission. Diehl and Druckman continue to assert, against the rliercriticism of Johansen (1994), that the evaluation should not restricted toareas directly under the control of peace operatives. They contend that onlyanalysing those outcomes under the control of the peace operation”presumes an a priori confirmation of effects of those particularoperations”. As stated earlier, the restriction proposed by Johansonprovides an unrealistic and skewered appraisal of the overall effect of amission on an conflict.
The collection .. contain a report by Diehl and Druckman ofthe results of applying he methodology to ..
It also contains reports of analyses by others of applyingthe methodology to other peace operations and their proposals for refining themethodology.John Braithwaite(200 applies the model to the East Timorpeace mission highlighting in his introduction, the weakness of the modelidentified by Diehl and Druckman themselves. This weakness involves giving atemporal and separate sequence and equal weighting to the processes of conflictcontainment, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Braithwaite also highlights anissue that has been raised here already, regarding the involvement of others inthe processes. As Braithwaite points out “most peacebuilding is not doneby peace operatives. However, as he points out, the model is easily adapted toevaluating the facilation of peace making that may be done by others (me isthis even worth putting in or put somewhere else as a brief comment??The inclusion of both common goals and specific mandates inthe framework by Diehl and Druckman allows for comparative quantative analysisacross missions while also taking into account the specifics of a mission.Their multidimensional approach enables the complexities of a mission and itsvariance over time to be reflected in the framework. As Braithwaite points out, it can be used ina flexible manner.
. .While it may be considered “another day’s work” toevaluate why successes and failures occur in a mission, a framework that istruly reflective of the implementation and its context, should ideallyfacilitate access to this information.
For example Braithwaite(2013) discussesthe issues with the police force in East Timor and how it contributed to thebreakdown of peace in 2006. HIs summary application of the Diehl and Druckmanframework points to this failure but doesn’t provide a clear reason forit. As Braithwaite points out, theframework can be very useful in providing a short summary evaluation of amission and more extensive work has actually been done using the framework as abasis. Thakur Ramesh, inreferencing the work of Diehl and Druckman, in a disscussion on tassertsthat ” It is relatively straightforward to point to successand failure on the various dimensions of performance appraisal provided by theDiehl-Druckman framework. It is far more challenging to try and provide soundand intersubjectively transmissible explanations for the successes andfailures” (2012)He references the work of Lise Morjé Howard who, for Thakur,provides a good complement in this respect to Diehl and Druckman by addressingthis issue in the context of UN missions in civil conflicts. Howard examines aset of successful and unsuccessful missions by querying why success or failureoccurred, what the learning outcomes were for the UN1.Interestingly Howard in her study, concludes that success, while difficult toachieve happens more than is generally perceived: it depends according to heron these conditions: agreement from local factions to UN presence, supportivebut not dominating engagement by the UNSC, and first tier detailed operationalknowledge by peace operatives on the ground.
Even when querying the source of failures and successes, andwhile including criteria that acknowledge the possible negative impact of amission, the frameworks referenced, all start from a positive perspective, andwith the assumption that the peace operation is fundamentally a good idea.In his review of the book, Peace Operations Success: AComparative Analysis by Diehl and Druckman (2013), and Why Peace Processes Fail, by Jasmine-Kim Westendorf (2015), ThierryTardy contrasts the more “optimistic” approach taken by Diehl andDruckman with that of Westendorf. Westendorfcriticises approaches that she feels either take a minimalist view, emphasisingphysical security or a “maximalist” approach that is focused on thebasis of conflict in general. She wants instead to take what she calls a”minimalist+politics” approach. As Tardy points out, Westendorfclaims that the failure of main peace missions lies in their lack of acknowledgementof conflict as political in nature. Rather than a series of separate events, she sees peace building as a process on acontinuum from a state of war. Starting from an end point of what a process of peace aims for, “to establish stablesocial political and security conditions in which political conflicts are nolonger settled by means of violence” and uses the three equivalentparameters of justice and governance creation along with transitional justiceto evaluate the process along that continuum.
In the case study that sheexamines she finds that where peace missions have engaged in a meaningful waywith the local political and social context, that the mission has proved moresuccessful.2Gezim Visoka takes the issue further by moving from a positiverealm to one where the intentionality of the mission and its stakeholders are interrogated. Heposits an alternative framework based on figurative sociology, which first advanced provides a framework of intentionality,preformativity and very importantly, consequences as in the framework outlinedbelow.This enables hidden intentions behind declared intentions tobe exposed (me how) and also provides an analysis of how implementation of aseemingly good intention can lead to negative consequences. For example, Visokarefers to goal of implementing law and order in Bosnia which was thenappropriated by ethnic factions to The different frameworks and methodologies provide differentstrengths.
For instance the more recent framework proposed by Diehl and Druckmancan be used to provide a summary analysis to monitor an ongoing peace operationor can be applied in greater detail with added indicators and dimensions to providean extensive analysis at different points during and after an operation, and istherefore a valuable and flexible toolset. However it is a toolset that assumesthe fundamental worth of the operation its monitoring and doesn’t provide directinformation on the reasons for success or failure. Also, while nuanced, it stilldoesn’t highlight the consequences of actions driven by different intentionalities..It Others such as Westendorf and Visoka provide alternative frameworks that caninterrogate more fully the interaction of the peace operation and host community,which enables the frameworks and their resulting analyses to reflect and belongmore fully to those communities as well to those who would wish to support themtowards peace.
1Howard’s examination includes the UN missions considered successful in Namiba,El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozamibique, E. Slavonia and East Timor as well thosedeemed a failure in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia.2Westendorf examines these case-studies: Cambodia(1991), Mozambique (1992),Bougainville(2001), Liberia(2003), North and South Sudan(2005) and Aceh(2005)